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Water security may not grab headlines, but is certainly a beneath-the-surface
homeland security issue that will need to be addressed in coming years as
nature and terrorism pose threats to supply.
That is part of the message from a November 2010 U.S. Geologic Survey
(USGS) Fact Sheet co-authored by James Tindall, a 2006 graduate of the Naval
Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Tindall wrote
the fact sheet along with Andrew Campbell, a former Australian intelligence
analyst specializing in Jihadist and terrorist deception techniques.
Tindall, who has written extensively on water-security issues, took time to
explain how water supply and security are homeland security issues:
Water affects or is incorporated into every facet of our lives, from energy
generation to manufacturing processes. As a tier one critical infrastructure, water along with energy, it represents
increased economic development within a nation, or lack of it, can represent substantially decreased economic
development or, total collapse of a country and continuity of government. Without water or when it is very scarce,
everything falls apart. As an example, a lack of water can increase food, commodity, and energy prices due to
reduction in agricultural production and lack of adequate supplies for energy production for hydroelectric processes.
For the latter we can use Hoover Dam as an example. Hoover Dam supplies water for 22 million people and
electricity for 7 million users; if water levels fall low enough in the reservoir due to sustained drought or other
reasons, electricity cannot be made by the dams turbines – the lost electricity will either need to be obtained
elsewhere or the users who typically get that electricity would need to move toward rolling blackouts for conservation
reasons; much like has happened during the last decade in California. Even now, Lake Meade, which is the
reservoir held back by Hoover Dam, is at historic water-level lows. And, it takes 2-years annual flow of the Colorado
River to fill Lake Meade without withdrawals of any kind. Since a large portion of Los Angeles’ electricity comes from
the Colorado River we could be on the verge of historic dire events, perhaps a Black Swan event in the making.
From a homeland security perspective, water security represents a net assessment of synthesized infrastructures
as generally discussed in critical infrastructure protection (CIP) issues, but at a more strategic level because the
cascading failures involved are not readily seen by CIP industrial experts and are at an increased degree of
governance and policy. Water security, due to its national and global significance and scope, is a true all-hazards
approach by the triad of hazards, i.e., manmade (terrorist), natural, and technological. In terms of billion dollar
infrastructures, both terrorist and technological hazards can be extreme, but also those caused by catastrophic
natural events such as earthquakes. If, for example, a large earthquake hit near Los Angeles, it could rupture the
Colorado River aqueduct with a loss of water supply of about 30-50 percent. The quake also could sever surface
conveyance pipes on a wide scale. Such an event could cause mass civil unrest.
Congress has designated the Department of Homeland Security as the lead agency in responding to terrorist
attacks and natural disasters, but technological hazards such as SCADA controls and cyber hacking have also
evolved as a central part of that mission. I believe that often, the reference to security in terms of physical gets in the
way. It should be noted that security here does not refer only to guards, gates, and guns, but generally to
sustainability and continuity of operations. This requires adequate safeguards, regulations, strategies, and policies
that are properly and efficiently implemented. But, which are difficult due to lack of broad-scope vision.
For example, let’s go back to Hoover Dam. Can a terrorist attack take it out? Yes! It could be done conventionally or
with a bio attack – details are unnecessary. Thus, preemptive mitigation is a must because there is no redundancy
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for this system. Consequently, it is not enough just to think of critical infrastructure and possible failures, attacks, etc.
There must be a synthesis of the whole, which only an agency such as DHS and those cooperating with it have the
capacities and capabilities to accomplish.
Let’s look at a small synopsis:
DHS has an idea of the consequences of loss of an infrastructure such as Hoover Dam, which may go something
like this should the dam be lost:
Total infrastructure collapse leaves 22 million without water and 7 million without energy; in turn massive civil unrest
erupts; public health issues arise, such as dysentery; 25 percent of U.S. economy affected; transportation logistics
are drastically modified and the event becomes a national security concern immediately that will be far reaching and
longer-term.
Many steps are missing, but you get the basic idea. DHS’ role would be to synthesize the process as a whole, not
from merely a CIP perspective, but an overall risk mitigation and assessment issue by coupling CIP with resources
security, infrastructure assets, merging intelligence capacities (figure 4 in report is a glimpse) – especially counter
intelligence, and law enforcement efforts (see report of Mohamed Atta scouting Hoover Dam) for detection,
prevention and response; coupling resource data and the flow of resources and commodities related to specific
infrastructures would become a component part as well. These activities would all be merged with Science and
Technology, mission directorate, policy and governance, and even economic issues and response. For example,
what would happen economically as a result of such an event? How would DHS anticipate that? Current
mechanisms do not seem to project or think that far ahead, but they should. Therefore, I believe DHS’ role is to
synthesize the whole, not concentrate on the myopic, despite the overall complexity.
As a comparison to a country with a lack of water, let’s look at Afghanistan; it has recently been discovered to have
over a trillion dollars in natural metals, and other resources. Given its water capacity, which is minimal, how can
these metals be extracted? Minimally at best. Why? At present, the bulk of urban and rural water supplies for
domestic and other municipal purposes are obtained from ground water sources, e.g. springs, karezes, and
manmade wells. Surface water supplies from the Kunar River (originating in Pakistan), the Kabul River (which flows
into Pakistan downstream), and the Helmand River for which a discharge treaty was signed in the 1970’s to give 26
m/s of Helmand River water all year round into Iran. All three rivers have been left reeling from the 2003 and 2006
droughts. These rivers also supply about 85 percent of the water used for agriculture in the country. This has
resulted in minimal country-wide infrastructure development. Thus, what would the consequences of such resource
extraction be with neighboring states? On foreign policy? National or International security?
The Delaware Aqueduct that supplies water to New York City, as well as the Sacramento Levee Systems and Clifton
Court Forebay that transport water to Southern California from the northern part of the state, are more examples.
These water systems are precarious at best in terms of potential failure and vulnerability, but which could have
devastating consequences on national security.
Too often we look at the infrastructure and not the resource, but that is a mistake because the infrastructure is
merely a mechanism of conveyance for the resource. Similarly, we look only at terrorists, their links, modus
operandi, etc. Likewise, too often we fail to consider what the terrorists are trying to accomplish – not that they are
just trying to make a point by destroying a particular thing, but why they are destroying that particular thing. If we
focused more on the latter, DHS’ job could be easier, but also more synthesized and effective. So, DHS would
couple resources and data, infrastructure, terrorists and their capabilities, and all intelligence processes to name a
few, into one system and look at them as a whole rather than singularly. This requires better synthesis, but also
more expertise in cascading effects over multiple, non-singular components. This is the drive behind the water-
security issue – to synthesize multiple programs and capacities across missions in a growing complex environment.
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